CONTAINMENT FAILURE AND RELEASE

In the core of an operating nuclear reactor, many different fission product isotopes are produced. Some have relatively long half-lives, such as cesium-137 (30 years). Others have relatively short half-lives. After the reactor is shut down, many of the short-lived fission products decay away rapidly, leading to a reduction in the quantity of radionuclides that are available to be released in an accident or terrorist attack.

According to a February 2002 preliminary analysis conducted by the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), after a shutdown of twenty days – which would greatly reduce the radioactive inventory in the core through decay – the number of acute fatalities (within a 10-mile radius) from a core meltdown and breach of containment could be reduced by 80 percent and the number of long-term cancer deaths (within a 50-mile radius) by 50 percent.

A reactor core's inventory of short-lived radioisotopes is substantially reduced just days after shutdown, thus reducing the potential incidence of early health effects and thyroid cancers in surrounding populations if a release occurs.

Removing the fuel from the reactor’s core can be done approximately a week after reactor shutdown.

It is easier to protect and monitor a nuclear power plant when the reactor is shut down. The site is most vulnerable while the reactor is operating. There are a number of ways to cause a meltdown of the reactor: cutting off-site power, destroying the coolant intakes, sabotage/destruction of safety systems, destruction of the control room, as well as crashing a jet into the reactor. The propensity of a reactor core to melt, if the flow of cooling water to the core is interrupted, is substantially reduced within a few hours of shutdown.

IRRADIATED “SPENT” FUEL FIRE AND RELEASE

Once Indian Point is permanently closed it will no longer be producing the irradiated fuel rods, which are most dangerous in the first six months upon removal from the reactor. With the plant closed, security forces can focus their protection on the irradiated fuel pool where this highly radioactive used fuel is stored. Currently, the building that houses each pool does not serve as containment. Entergy should immediately construct a containment structure over the pools.

Irradiated spent fuel, older than five years, can be removed from the spent fuel pools and placed in “hardened” dry storage. Stored in hardened dry casks and dispersed and concealed appropriately, the irradiated spent fuel is less vulnerable to accidents, sabotage or a terrorist attack.

As recommended by industry experts, the remaining spent fuel assemblies in the pool must be reconfigured so that the density is reduced and there is more space in between each assembly. The current spacing between fuel assemblies is dangerously close which increases the likelihood of a spent fuel pool fire consuming more fuel and releasing greater amounts of radioactivity.