The NRC has yet to upgrade its current design-basis threat level to require nuclear power plants to be able to defend against a 9/11-type terrorist attack. According to U.S. intelligence sources, U.S. nuclear power plants were originally chosen as targets during the planning of the 9/11 attacks, and they remain terrorist targets today. The 9/11 Commission found that as recently as June 16, 2004 nuclear power plants remained top al Qaeda targets. During an interview on Meet the Press with Tim Russert (December 4, 2005), Thomas Kean, Chair of the 9-11 Commission, noted that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has done “something that’s totally inadequate” in making a risk assessment for U.S. nuclear power plants and chemical plants, concluding that DHS “doesn’t set the priorities out, it just sets basically vague guidelines what the priorities should be.”

Riverkeeper’s concerns have been compounded by two government reports that suggest that high-level radioactive fuel waste is not properly safeguarded. The first, released in April 2005 by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), calls for a plant-by-plant examination of the fuel storage pools at nuclear power reactors because the material stored is a vulnerable terrorist target and that a successful strike could result in lethal radioactive emissions. The second disturbing revelation comes from a report by the General Accountability Office (GAO), also released in April 2005. It charges that the federal government, the NRC, and nuclear power plant owners have failed to implement and enforce accountability measures for high-level radioactive waste currently stored onsite in spent fuel pools. Since 2000, three nuclear power plant operators, including Entergy, have “lost” high-level radioactive fuel rods.

In January 2006, Riverkeeper filed public comments with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to the Committee to Bridge the Gap’s petition for rulemaking which calls for enhanced security regulations at our nation’s nuclear power plants. Riverkeeper requested enhanced protections to guard against air attacks and urged the construction of “Beamhenge” shields to guard sensitive reactor structures from air attacks. Moreover, Riverkeeper urged enhanced protection against waterborne attacks. For example, the present “exclusion zone” around Indian Point, as well as other regional reactors located on waterbodies, are marked by buoys or floating “no-trespassing” signs and are not impenetrable.