RIVERKEEPER, INC. AND HUDSON RIVER SLOOP CLEARWATER, INC. NEW CONTENTION REGARDING NEPA REQUIREMENT TO ADDRESS SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NRC FUKUSHIMA TASK FORCE REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1), Riverkeeper, Inc. and Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. (collectively “Intervenors”) assert a new contention seeking consideration of new and significant information relevant to the environmental analysis for the proposed re-licensing of the Indian Point Unit 2 and 3 reactors at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant in Buchanan, New York. In the contention set forth in Section II below, Intervenors request a hearing on the significant – indeed extraordinary – safety and environmental implications for the Indian Point licensing decision of the conclusions and recommendations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Near-Term Task Force (the “Task Force”). The contention is supported by the expert declaration of Dr. Arjun Makhijani of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. The contention is also supported by a Motion to Admit a New Contention.
The Task Force, a group of highly qualified and experienced Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or the "Commission") staff members selected by the Commission to evaluate the regulatory implications of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, has issued a report recommending the NRC strengthen its regulatory scheme for protecting public health and safety by increasing the scope of accidents that fall within the "design basis" and are therefore subject to mandatory safety regulation. **Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident** at 20-21 (July 12, 2011) ("Task Force Report"). The Task Force’s recommendations to establish mandatory safety regulations for severe accidents raise extremely grave environmental and safety concerns for operating reactors. Indeed, it would not be logical or necessary to recommend an upgrade to the basic level of protection currently afforded by NRC regulations unless those existing regulations were insufficient to ensure adequate protection of public health, safety, and the environment throughout the licensed life of nuclear reactors. The recommendations are all the more grave because they constitute the second warning that the Commission has received regarding the need to expand the scope of design basis accidents. The first warning, issued by the Rogovin Report over thirty years ago, following the Three Mile Island accident and explained in more detail in Section II below, essentially went unheeded. *Id.* at 16-17. As the Task Force urges, “the time has come” to make fundamental changes to the NRC’s program for establishing minimum safety requirements for nuclear reactors. *Id.* at 18.

Moreover, the Task Force’s recommendation that the scope of mandatory safety regulations be expanded to include severe accidents raises significant environmental concerns in this proceeding, including that (1) the risks of operating Indian Point under a renewed license are higher than estimated in the NRC Staff’s Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement.
("FSEIS")¹ and (2) NRC Staff’s previous environmental analysis of the relative costs and
benefits of severe accident mitigation alternatives ("SAMAs") is fundamentally inadequate
because those measures are, in fact, necessary to assure adequate protection of the public health
and safety and, therefore, should be imposed without regard to their cost.

Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the analysis demanded by
this contention may not be deferred until after Indian Point is re-licensed. Given that the NRC
Commissioners have postponed taking action on the Task Force’s recommendations, admission
of this contention constitutes the only immediate means of ensuring that the environmental
implications of the Task Force recommendations are taken into account in the license renewal
decision for Indian Point.

Intervenors note that this contention is substantially similar to contentions and comments
that are being filed this week in other pending reactor licensing and re-licensing cases and
standardized design certification proceedings. In addition, Intervenors have joined with other
individuals and organizations in a rulemaking petition seeking to suspend any regulations that
would preclude full consideration of the environmental implications of the Task Force Report. A
copy of the rulemaking petition is attached. Finally, in an Emergency Petition, now pending
before the Commission for nearly four months, many of the same organizations and individuals
previously asked the Commission to suspend its licensing decisions while it evaluated the
environmental implications of the Fukushima accident and to establish procedures for the fair
and meaningful consideration of those issues in licensing hearings. Emergency Petition to
Suspend All Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and Related Rulemaking Decisions Pending

¹ NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants,
Supplement 38 Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (December 2010)
(hereinafter cited as "IP License Renewal FSEIS").
Investigation of Lessons learned From Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Accident

In the aggregate, these contentions, rulemaking comments, and the rulemaking petition follow-up on the Emergency Petition’s demand that the NRC comply with NEPA by addressing the lessons of the Fukushima accident in its environmental analyses for licensing decisions. Having received no response to their Emergency Petition, many of the signatories to the Emergency Petition now seek consideration of the Task Force’s far-reaching conclusions and recommendations in each individual licensing proceeding, including the instant case.

Intervenors recognize that given the sweeping scope of the Task Force conclusions and recommendations, the NRC may approach these issues generically, rather than in site-specific environmental proceedings. That is for the NRC to decide. *Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 462 U.S. 87, 100 (1983). It is the NRC, and not the public, which is responsible for compliance with NEPA. *Duke Power Co. et al.* (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1049 (1983).

**II. INTERVENORS’ NEW CONTENTION SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 (f)(1).**

1. **Statement of Contention.**

The FSEIS for Indian Point license renewal fails to satisfy the requirements of NEPA because it does not address the new and significant environmental implications of the findings and recommendations raised by the NRC’s Fukushima Task Force Report. As required by NEPA and the NRC regulations, these implications must be addressed in either a revised FSEIS, or a Supplement to the FSEIS.
2. Brief Explanation of the Basis for the Contention.

The Task Force Report.

This contention is based on the Task Force Report, in which the Commission instructed the Task Force to provide:

A systematic and methodical review of [NRC] processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Task Force Report at vii. In response to that directive, the Task Force prepared a detailed history of the NRC’s program for regulation of safety and public health and evaluated that program in light of the experience of the Fukushima accident.

The Task Force then assessed the risk posed by “continued operation and continued licensing activities” for U.S. nuclear plants. Applying the NRC’s standard for whether nuclear plants pose an “imminent risk” such that they should be shut down immediately, see, e.g., Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-6, 43 NRC 123, 128 (1996) (finding no “imminent hazard” that would warrant shutdown of a reactor), the Task Force found that no imminent risk was posed by operation or licensing. Id. at 18. In addition, the Task Force concluded that U.S. reactors meet the statutory standard for security, i.e., they are “not inimical to the common defense and security.” Id. at 18; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (forbidding the NRC from licensing reactors if their operation would be “inimical to the common defense and security”). Notably, however, the Task Force did not report a conclusion that licensing of reactors would not be “inimical to public health and safety,” as the Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) requires for licensing of reactors. 42 U.S.C. § 2133.
Instead, the Task Force concluded that the regulatory system on which the NRC relies to make the safety findings that the AEA requires for licensing of reactors must be strengthened by raising the level of safety that is minimally required for the protection of public health and safety:

In response to the Fukushima accident and the insights it brings to light, the Task Force is recommending actions, some general, some specific, that it believes would be a reasonable, well-formulated set of actions to increase the level of safety associated with adequate protection of the public health and safety.

*Id.* at 18 (emphasis added). In particular, the Task Force found that “the NRC’s safety approach is incomplete without a strong program for dealing with the unexpected, including severe accidents.” *Id.* at 20. Therefore, the Task Force recommended that the NRC incorporate severe accidents into the “design basis” and subject it to mandatory safety regulations. In order to upgrade the design basis, the Task Force also recommended that the NRC undertake new safety investigations and impose design changes, equipment upgrades, and improvements to emergency planning and operating procedures. *See, e.g.*, Task Force Report at 73-75.²

The Task Force also found that the Fukushima accident was not the first warning the NRC had received that it needed to strengthen its safety program in order to provide an adequate level of protection to public health and safety. After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, an independent body appointed to investigate the accident’s implications, headed by Mitchell Rogovin of the NRC’s Special Inquiry Group, recommended that the NRC “[e]xpand the spectrum of design basis accidents.” *Id.* at 16. But the NRC did little to follow the recommendations of the Rogovin Report. While it “encouraged licensees to search for vulnerabilities” in their plant designs through Individual Plant Examination (“IPE”) and

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² The Task Force Report contains twelve “overarching” recommendations, which are summarized on pages 69-70.
Individual Plant Examination for External Events ("IPEEE") programs and encouraged the development of severe accident mitigation guidelines ("SAMGs"), "the Commission did not take action to require the IPEs, IPEEEs, or SAMGs." *Id.* Thus, the Task Force concluded that:

While the Commission has been partially responsive to recommendations calling for requirements to address beyond-design-basis accidents, the NRC has not made fundamental changes to the regulatory approach for beyond-design-basis events and severe accidents for operating reactors.

*Id.* at 17. Looking back on the Commission's failure to heed the Rogovin Report's recommendations, the Task Force urged that "the time has come" when NRC safety regulations must be "reviewed, evaluated and changed, as necessary, to insure [sic] that they continue to address the NRC's requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety." *Id.* at 18.

To finally fulfill the Rogovin Report's recommendation, a need now re-confirmed by the Fukushima Task Force, a major re-evaluation and overhaul of the NRC's regulatory program is required. As the Task Force recognized, the great majority of the NRC's current regulations do not impose mandatory safety requirements for severe accidents, and severe accident measures are adopted only on a "voluntary" basis or through a "patchwork" of requirements. *Id.*

The lack of an NRC program for mandatory regulation of severe accidents is clearly evident from the regulations themselves. The Part 50 regulations, which establish fundamental safety requirements for all reactors (including the current generation and the proposed new generation), are based on a "design basis" that does not include severe accidents. Task Force Report at 16. While NRC NEPA regulations require consideration of severe accident mitigation measures, they need not be adopted unless they are found to be cost-beneficial. *See, e.g.*, *Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.* (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-
11-17, slip op. at 17 (July 14, 2011). Because the imposition of severe accident mitigation measures is based on cost considerations, they are not part of the design basis for adequate protection of public health and safety. *Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC*, 824 F.2d 108, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1987).³

Therefore, the NRC’s current regulatory scheme requires significant re-evaluation and revision in order to expand or upgrade the design basis for reactor safety as recommended by the Task Force Report. The fact that this effort has been postponed for thirty years makes the scope of the required undertaking all the more urgent.

**The National Environmental Policy Act.**

The contention is also based on NEPA, “our basic national charter for protection of the environment.” 40 C.F.R § 1500.1(a). NEPA requires a federal agency to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for any “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i). This duty to carefully consider information regarding a project’s environmental impacts is non-discretionary. *Silva v. Romney*, 473 F.2d 287, 292 (1st Cir. 1973). Federal agencies are held to a “strict standard of compliance” with the Act’s requirements. *Calvert Cliff’s Coordinating Commission v. AEC*, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

³ Even the NRC’s Part 52 regulations for new reactors do not contain mandatory requirements for severe accident mitigation features. While the Part 52 regulations require combined license applicants to submit analyses of measures to mitigate severe accidents, Part 52 contains no standards for the adequacy of such analyses. In addition, the Commission has also stated that Part 52 severe accident mitigation measures, which must be described under the NRC’s safety regulations in 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.47(a)(23) and 52.79(a)(38), are subject to cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Statement of Considerations (“SOC”) for AP1000 design certification rule, 10 C.F.R. Part 52 Appendix B, 71 Fed. Reg. 4,464, 4,469 (January 27, 2006) (“Westinghouse’s evaluation of various design alternatives to prevent and mitigate severe accidents does not constitute design requirements. The Commission’s assessment of this information is discussed in Section VII [sic] of this SOC on environmental impacts.”).

"An agency that has prepared an EIS cannot simply rest on the original document. The agency must be alert to new information that may alter the results of its original environmental analysis, and continue to take a 'hard look' at the environmental effects of [its] planned action, even after a proposal has received initial approval." *Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck*, 222 F.3d 552, 557-58 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Marsh*, 490 U.S. at 373-74); see also *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fed. Aviation Admin.*, 564 F.3d 549, 561 (2d Cir. 2009) ("In determining whether to prepare a supplemental EIS, the agency has an obligation to take a 'hard look' at the new circumstances and information. . . We review the agency's decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS . . . asking . . . whether the agency took the 'hard look' that the new circumstances required . . .").

NRC's NEPA-implementing regulations require NRC to prepare draft and final environmental impact statements in connection with the renewal of an operating license for a nuclear power plant. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.95(c); 51.70; 51.71. NRC's EIS must contain an analysis that "considers and weighs the environmental effects of the proposed actions; the environmental impacts of alternatives to the proposed actions; and alternatives available for
reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects and consideration of the economic, technical, and other benefits and costs of the proposed action and alternatives.” See 10 C.F.R. § 51.71(d).

Within this regulatory framework, “[t]he Commission recognizes a continuing obligation to conduct its domestic licensing and related regulatory functions in a manner which is both receptive to environmental concerns and consistent with the Commission’s responsibility as an independent regulatory agency for protecting the radiological health and safety of the public.” Id. § 51.10 (b) (emphasis added).

The Indian Point FSEIS Does Not Consider the Significant New Information Contained in the Task Force Report and the FSEIS Must Be Supplemented to Comply with NEPA.

NEPA requires federal agencies to supplement their NEPA documentation when “there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1509(c)(1)(ii). A federal agency’s continuing duty to take a “hard look” at the environmental effects of their actions requires they consider, evaluate, and make a reasoned determination about the significance of this new information and prepare supplemental NEPA documentation accordingly. Warm Springs Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d at 1023-24; Stop H-3 Association v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1984). The need to supplement under NEPA when there is new and significant information is also found throughout the NRC regulations. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.92(a)(2), 51.50(c)(iii), 51.53(b), 51.53(c)(3)(iv).

The conclusions and recommendations presented in the Task Force Report constitute “new and significant information,” the environmental implications of which must be considered before the NRC may make a decision that approves license renewal for Indian Point. First, the information is “new” because it stems directly from the Fukushima accident, which occurred only five months ago and for which the special study commissioned by the Commission has only
just been issued. New emerging facts from the Fukushima catastrophe unequivocally show that the consequences of a severe accident are worse than previously anticipated. See Makhijani Declaration, par. 11.

Second, the information is “significant” because it raises an extraordinary level of concern regarding the manner in which the proposed license renewal of Indian Point “impacts public health and safety.” See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(2). For the first time since the Three Mile Island accident occurred in 1979, a highly respected group of scientists and engineers within the NRC Staff has fundamentally questioned the adequacy of the current level of safety provided by the NRC’s program for nuclear reactor regulation. NEPA demands that federal agencies “insure the professional integrity, including the scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses” included in an EIS and disclose “all major points of view on the environmental impacts” including any “responsible opposing view.” Courts have found that an EIS that fails to disclose and respond to expert opinions concerning the hazards of a proposed action, particularly those opinions of the agency’s own experts, are “fatally deficient” and run contrary to NEPA’s “hard look” requirement. As a result, the NRC must revisit any conclusions in the Indian Point FSEIS

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5 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(a), (b).

6 Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service, 349 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding an EIS’s failure to disclose and discuss responsible opposing scientific viewpoints violated NEPA and the implementing regulations); Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F.Supp. 1473, 1479 (W.D. Wa. 1992) aff’d sub nom Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Hall, 693 F.Supp. 904, 934 (W.D. Wa. 1988) (“[a]n EIS that fails to disclose and respond to ‘the opinions held by well respected scientists concerning the hazards of the proposed action...is fatally deficient.’”)); Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 487 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that agency failed to take a “hard look” under NEPA when it ignored concerns raised by its own experts). See also Blue Mtns. Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that an agency’s failure to discuss and consider an independent scientific report’s recommendations “lends weight to [plaintiff’s] claim that the [agency] did not take the requisite ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences” of the project).
based on the assumption that compliance with NRC safety regulations is sufficient to ensure that environmental impacts of accidents are acceptable.

*The Task Force Report Reveals that the Full Spectrum of All Design-Basis Accidents Has Not Been Assessed and FSEIS Must Be Supplemented to Consider Additional Design-Basis Accidents that Have the Potential for Releases to the Environment.*

In Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 51, the NRC reports a determination that the environmental impacts of both design basis accidents and severe accidents are “small.” NRC Staff’s FSEIS in the Indian Point license renewal proceeding relies upon this determination. *See* IP License Renewal FSEIS at 5-2, 5-3. The findings of the Task Force Report call into question whether this determination represents a full, accurate description and examination of all the design basis accidents having the potential for releases to the environment. *See* Makhijani Declaration, pars. 7-10. If the design basis for the reactor does not incorporate accidents that should be considered in order to satisfy the adequate protection standard, then it is not possible to reach a conclusion that the design of the reactor adequately protects against accident risks.

*The FSEIS Must Be Supplemented in Light of the Task Force Findings that Certain Accidents Formerly Classified as Severe Should Be Incorporated into the Design Basis.*

By recommending the incorporation of accidents formerly classified as “severe” or “beyond design basis” into the design basis, the Task Force effectively recommends a complete overhaul of the NRC’s system for mitigating severe accidents through consideration of SAMAs. *See* 10 C.F.R. § 51.45(c). As the Task Force recognizes, currently the NRC does not impose measures for the mitigation of severe accidents unless they are shown to be cost-beneficial or unless they are adopted voluntarily. Task Force Report at 15; *see also* Indian Point License Renewal FSEIS at 5-4 (NRC Staff employing a cost-benefit approach for the SAMA analysis, for example, explaining method whereby “the costs and benefits of each of the remaining
SAMAs were compared to determine whether the SAMA was cost beneficial"). But the Task Force recommends that severe accident mitigation measures should be adopted into the design basis, i.e., the set of regulations adopted without regard to their cost as fundamentally required for all NRC standards that set requirements for adequate protection of health and safety. *Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC*, 824 F.2d 108, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Thus, the values assigned to the cost-benefit analysis for Indian Point SAMAs, as described in Section 5.2 of the FSEIS, must be re-evaluated in light of the Task Force’s conclusion that the value of SAMAs is so high that they should be elected as a matter of course.

Were SAMAs imposed as mandatory measures, the outcome of the FSEIS for Indian Point could be affected significantly in two major respects. First, severe accident mitigative measures now rejected as too costly may be required, thus substantially improving the safety of the operation of Indian Point if it is re-licensed. Second, consideration of the costs of mandatory mitigative measures could affect the overall cost-benefit analysis for the reactors. As discussed in Dr. Makhijani’s declaration, these costs may be significant, showing that other alternatives such as the no-action alternative and other alternative electricity production sources may be more attractive. As the fundamental purposes of NEPA are: (1) to guarantee that the government

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7 *See also* 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.71(d); 51.75(c)(2) (allowing EISs for combined license applications (“COLAs”) that rely on certified standardized designs to reference the severe accident mitigation analyses for those designs); *see also* Memorandum from NRC Staff to AP1000 and ESBWR design-Centered Working Groups re: Summary of the March 22 and 23, 2007, Meeting to Discuss pre-Combined License Application Issues (April 23, 2007) (suggesting that some SAMAs for proposed reactors with standardized designs should be included in the design application and some should be included in COLAs).

8 *See* 10 C.F.R. § 51.71(d) (explaining that environmental impact statements should also include “consideration of the economic, technical, and other benefits and costs of the proposed action alternatives”).

9 NEPA requires the NRC to include in its EIS a “detailed statement . . . on . . . alternatives to the proposed action.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii). The alternatives analysis should address “the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for the choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public.” 40 C.F.R. §
takes a “hard look” at all of the environmental consequences of proposed federal actions before
the actions occur, *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); and
(2) to “guarantee[] that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience
that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that
decision,” *id.* at 349, the NRC will fail to meet the fundamental purposes of NEPA if it does not
include all of the costs associated with required mitigative measures. *See Sierra Club v. Sigler*,
695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983) (“There can be no ‘hard look’ at the costs and benefits unless
all costs are disclosed.”).

*The FSEIS Must Be Supplemented to Include a Discussion of the Task Force Report’s
Recommended Measures to Ensure the Plant’s Protection From Seismic and Flooding Events.*

Following the devastating events in Japan, the Task Force Report explained the
importance of protecting systems, structures, and components (SSCs) of nuclear reactors from
natural phenomena, including seismic and flooding hazards:

Protection from natural phenomena [such as earthquakes and
flooding] is critical for safe operation of nuclear power plants due
to potential common-cause failures and significant contribution to
core damage frequency from external events. Failure to adequately
protect SSCs important to safety from appropriate design-basis
natural phenomena with appropriate safety margins has the
potential for common-cause failures and significant consequences
as demonstrated at Fukushima.


1502.14. This analysis must “rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.” 40
C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). Agencies must consider three types of alternatives, which include a no action
alternative, other reasonable courses of actions, and mitigation measures not in the proposed action. 40
C.F.R. § 1508.25. The purpose of this section is “to insist that no major federal project should be
undertaken without intense consideration of other more ecologically sound courses of action, including
shelving the entire project, or of accomplishing the same result by entirely different means.”
of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an [EIS] inadequate.” *Natural Resources Defense Council
Hodel*, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Yet, the Task Force found that significant differences may exist between plants in the way they protect against design-basis natural phenomena (including seismic and flooding hazards) and the safety margin provided. Task Force Report at 29. For instance, while tsunami hazards have been considered in the design basis for operating plants sited on the Pacific Ocean, the same cannot be said for those sited on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. *Id.* Accordingly, the Task Force recommended that licensees reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites and if necessary update the design basis and SSCs important to safety to protect against the updated hazards. Task Force Report at 30.

The Indian Point license renewal FSEIS must be supplemented in light of this new and significant information. The Task Force’s findings and recommendations are directly relevant to environmental concerns and have a bearing on the proposed action and its impacts as they point to the need for a reevaluation of the seismic and flooding hazards at the Indian Point site, a “hard look” at the environmental consequences such hazards could pose, and an examination of what, if any, design measures could be implemented (i.e. through NEPA’s requisite “alternatives” analysis) to ensure that the public is adequately protected from these risks.

*The FSEIS Must Be Supplemented to Include a Discussion of the Additional Mitigation Measures Recommended by the Task Force Report.*

“The discussion of steps that can be taken to mitigate adverse environmental consequences plays an important role in the environmental analysis under NEPA.” *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989); see also 1502.16(h) (stating that an EIS must contain “means to mitigate adverse environmental impacts”). There must be a “reasonably complete discussion of possible mitigation measures.” *Robertson*, 490 U.S. at 352. Mitigation measures may be found insufficient when the agency fails to study the efficacy of the proposed mitigation, fails to take certain steps to ensure the efficacy of the proposed mitigation (such as
including mandatory conditions in permits), or fails to consider alternatives in the event that the mitigation measures fail. *Id.*

The Task Force Report makes several significant findings when it comes to increasing and improving mitigation measures at reactors and recommends a number of specific steps licensees could take in this regard. These recommendations include strengthening station blackout ("SBO") mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events, (Section 4.2.1), requiring reliable hardened vent designs in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments (Section 4.2.2), enhancing spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation for the spent fuel pool (Section 4.2.4), strengthening and integrating onsite emergency response capabilities such as EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs (Section 4.2.5) and addressing multi-unit accidents. *See also* Makhijani Declaration, pars. 18-24.

Accordingly, the Indian Point license renewal FSEIS must be supplemented to consider the use of these additional mitigation measures to reduce the project’s environmental impacts. *See* 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14 (f), 1502.16), 1508.25 (b)(3))

**Requirement for Prior Consideration of Environmental Impacts.**

The Task Force urges that some of its recommendations be considered before certain licensing decisions are made. For instance, the Task Force concludes that Recommendation 4 (proposing new requirements for prolonged SBO mitigation) and Recommendation 7 (proposing measures for spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation) should apply to all design certifications or to combined operating licenses ("COL") applicants if the recommended requirements are not addressed in the referenced certified design. Task Force Report at 71. The Task Force recommends that design certifications and COLs under active staff review address this recommendation “before licensing.” *Id.* at 72.
Intervenors respectfully submit that this is the appropriate *and required* approach for NEPA consideration of Recommendations 4 and 7 and all of the Task Force’s remaining conclusions and recommendations. Before making a decision regarding renewal of the Indian Point operating licenses, for example, the NRC must evaluate the relative costs and benefits of adopting Recommendations 4 and 7 in light of the NRC’s increased understanding regarding accident risks and the strength of its regulatory program to prevent or mitigate them. And the NRC must apply the same analysis to all of the recommendations, not just Recommendations 4 and 7. NEPA requires the NRC to address the environmental implications of the Task Force’s analysis *before* making a re-licensing decision for Indian Point, in order to ensure that “important effects [of the licensing decision] will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.” *Robertson*, 490 U.S. at 349. *See also* 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(c), 1502.1, 1502.14. The NRC’s obligation to comply with NEPA in this respect is independent of and in addition to the NRC’s responsibilities under the AEA, and must be enforced to the “fullest extent possible.” *Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee*, 449 F.2d at 1115; *see also Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC*, 869 F.2d 719, 729 (3rd Cir. 1989) (citing *Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. NRC*, 582 F.2d 77, 86 (1st Cir. 1978)). Under NEPA, therefore, the Commission is required to address the Task Force’s findings and recommendations as they pertain to Indian Point before making a licensing decision, regardless of whether it does or does not choose to do so in the context of its AEA-based regulations.

Of course the Commission could moot the contention by adopting all of the Task Force’s recommendations. *See Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC*, 524 F.2d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975). However, a majority of the Commissioners has voted not to do so immediately. *See Notation Vote Response Sheets re: SECY-11-0093, Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency
Actions Following the Events in Japan, posted on the NRC’s website at [http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2011/](http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2011/). Thus, while the NRC may eventually address the Task Force’s recommendations in the context of its AEA-based regulatory scheme, the Commission has given no indication that it intends to address any of the Task Force’s conclusions in its prospective licensing decisions. In the absence of any AEA-based review of the Task Force’s conclusions, the Indian Point license renewal FSEIS must be supplemented in order to meet NEPA’s goal that the NRC’s licensing decision for Indian Point will be “based on an accurate understanding of the environmental consequences of [its] actions.”

*Indian Point*, LBP-11-17, slip op. at 17.

3. **Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding.**

The contention is within the scope of the proceeding because it seeks compliance with NEPA and NRC-implementing regulations, which must be complied with before Indian Point may be re-licensed. *See* 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.72, 51.95(c).

4. **Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Re-License Indian Point.**

As demonstrated above in Section II.2, this contention challenges NRC Staff’s failure to fully comply with NEPA and federal regulations implementing NEPA in relation to FSEIS concerning the proposed license renewal of Indian Point. Unless the NRC complies with the procedural requirements of NEPA that are discussed in the contention, it cannot make a valid finding that Indian Point should be re-licensed. Therefore the contention is material to the findings the NRC must make in order to re-license this facility.

Intervenors recognize that some issues raised by the Task Force Report may be appropriate for generic rather than case-specific resolution. The determination of whether it is
appropriate to address the issues raised in this contention generically or on a case-specific basis is a discretionary matter for the NRC to decide. *Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC*, 462 U.S. at 100. Nevertheless, any generic resolution of the issues must be reached *before* the licensing decision in this case is made, and must be applied to this licensing decision.

*Robertson*, 490 U.S. at 350.

5. **Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along With Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials.**

Intervenors rely on the facts and opinions of the Task Force members as set forth in their Task Force Report and as summarized above in Section II.2. The high level of technical qualifications of the Task Force members has been recognized by the Commission. *See* Transcript of May 12, 2011, briefing at 5, in which Commissioner Magwood refers to the Task force as the NRC’s “A-team.”

Additional technical support is provided by the attached Declaration of Dr. Arjun Makhijani, which confirms the environmental significance of the Task Force’s findings and recommendations with respect to the environmental analyses for all pending nuclear reactor licensing cases (as well as design certification applications), including the instant case.

6. **Sufficient Information to Show the Existence of a Genuine Dispute With the Applicant and the NRC.**

Based on the complete failure of the NRC to address the environmental implications of the Task Force Report for the proposed re-licensing of Indian Point, it appears that the parties have a dispute as to whether the FSEIS for the facility must be revised to address those implications. As demonstrated above in Section II.2., the Task Force Report and Dr. Makhijani’s Declaration provide sufficient information to show the genuineness and materiality of the dispute.
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the contention is admissible and should be admitted for a hearing.

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of August 2011.

Deborah Brancato, Esq.
Phillip Musegaas, Esq.
Riverkeeper, Inc.
20 Secor Road
Ossining, NY 10562
(914) 478-4501
dbrancato@riverkeeper.org
phillip@riverkeeper.org

Manna Jo Greene
Karla Raimundi
Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc.
724 Wolcott Ave
Beacon, NY 12508
Mannajo@clearwater.org
karla@clearwater.org